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Abstract
Previous analyses of a large ensemble of stock markets have demonstrated that a
log-periodic power law (LPPL) behavior of the prices constitutes a qualifying sig-
nature of speculative bubbles that often land with a crash. We detect such a LPPL
signature in the foreign capital inflow during the bubble on the US markets culmi-
nating in March 2000. We detect a weak synchronization and lag with the NAS-
DAQ 100 LPPL pattern. We propose to rationalize these observations by the exis-
tence of positive feedback loops between market-appreciation / increased-spending /
increased-deficit-of-balance-of-payment / larger-foreign-surplus / increased-foreign-
capital-inflows and so on. Our analysis suggests that foreign capital inflow have been
following rather than causing the bubble.
We then combine a macroeconomic analysis of feedback processes occurring be-
tween the economy and the stock market with a technical analysis of more than
two hundred years of the DJIA to investigate possible scenarios for the future, three
years after the end of the bubble and deep into a bearish regime. We conclude that
the low interest rates and depreciating dollar are the indispensable ingredients for a
lower sustainable burden of the global US debt structure and for allowing the slow
rebuilding of an internationally competitive economy. This will probably be accom-
panied by a weak stock market on the medium term as the growing Federal deficit
is consuming a large part of the foreign surplus dollars and the stock market is
remaining a very risky and unattractive investment. Notwithstanding strong surge
of liquidity in recent months orchestrated by the Federal Reserve, this macroeco-
nomic analysis which incorporates an element of collective behavior is in line with
our recent analyses of the bearish market that started in 2000 in terms of a LPPL
“anti-bubble.” We project this LPPL anti-bubble to continue at least for another
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year. On the short term, increased availability of liquidity (M1) and self-fulfilling
bullish anticipations may hold the stock market for a while.
Key words: Foreign capital inflow, speculative bubble, new economy, dollar
depreciation, depression
1 Introduction
According to more than a half-century of academic research, stock market
prices move almost like a (slightly biased geometric) random walk [7,41]. Im-
provements accounting for the presence of heavy tails in the distribution of
returns and of volatility persistence have not modified significantly the view
in the academic literature that the stock market is generally (weakly) efficient
and arbitrages away potential winning investment strategies [15]. A more elab-
orated understanding of potential gains was shown to be associated with risk:
the return-risk trade-off theory holds that there are actually winning invest-
ment strategies but they come generally with increasing risks, so that a larger
average return is a compensation for a larger risk [42]. This constitutes one of
the central insights of modern financial economics. There are two main ver-
sions of this return-risk trade-off. In the first one, if a security’s expected price
change is positive, it may just be the reward needed to attract investors to hold
the asset and bear the associated risks. In the second version, profits earned
by industrious investors, who are willing to work hard to gather information
and to develop winning strategies, may be viewed as economic rents that ac-
crue to those willing to engage in such activities. This entails that perfectly
informationally efficient markets are an impossibility, for if markets are per-
fectly efficient, the return to gathering information is nil, in which case there
would be little reason to trade and markets would eventually collapse [26].
Black proposed that “noise traders”, that is individuals who trade on what
they think is information but is in fact merely noise, are the providers of the
rents [5]. More generally, at any time there are always investors who trade for
reasons other than accruing capital gains–for example, those with unexpected
liquidity needs–and these investors are willing to “pay up” for the privilege of
executing their trades immediately. In agent-based models, this competition
with such “producers” and the speculative investors can be shown to provide
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sustainable deviations from perfect market efficiency [63,49]. Recent work in
behavioral finance has also made clear that, in order to understand market
behaviors, one needs to recognize that humans are governed by a number of
non-rational considerations, such as overconfidence, extrapolation from small
samples of evidence, loss aversion (reluctance to realize losses), representa-
tiveness, mental accounting, relative reference levels and self-esteem issues
(reluctance to admit an erroneous investment decision) [46–48]. Professional
and private investors on the stock market have not waited for these academic
developments to use so-called technical indicators (see for instance [18,4] and
http://www.traders.com/). A significant component of the texture of stock
market prices may thus be the result of patterns generated by such behavioral
biases and by self-fulfilling technical indicators.
The most striking deviations from market efficiency are arguably the specula-
tive bubbles followed by financial crashes. The post-mortem analysis of many
financial bubbles (identified as such after their demise) have shown that their
development follow essentially the same route. The following scenario underly-
ing financial bubbles and crashes has repeated itself over the centuries and in
many different locations since the famous tulip bubble of 1636 in Amsterdam,
almost without any alteration in its main global characteristics [19,20,34,51].
(1) This first stage is characterized by positive economic indicators. The bub-
ble starts smoothly with some increasing production and sales (or demand
for some commodity), in a relatively optimistic market. Investors form
positive expectations for the future and consequently buy the market,
pushing it up.
(2) The attraction to investments with good potential gains then leads to
increasing investments, possibly with leverage coming from novel sources
of funds, often from international investors who are attracted by the
potential for diversification and for boosting their revenue. This leads to
further price appreciation.
(3) This in turn attracts less sophisticated investors. In addition, leveraging
is further developed with small down payment (small margins), which
lead to a demand for stock rising faster than the rate at which real
money is put in the market. In this regime, foreign investors are even
more attracted by the smaller margin requirements and the more flexible
investment rules that are often accompanying a strong bullish market 2 .
(4) At this stage, the behavior of the market becomes weakly coupled or prac-
tically uncoupled from real wealth (industrial and service) production. It
is mostly the expectation of further capital gains which continues to at-
tract investors, hoping to sell even higher what they buy at over-valued
prices. The bubble is in regime of self-fulfilling expectations.
(5) As the price skyrockets, some investors start to cash in their gains and
2 Not all these ingredients may be simultaneously present in a given bubble
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they and others question the sustainability of the process. As a conse-
quence, the number of new investors entering the speculative market may
finally lose its momentum and the market may enter a phase of larger
nervousness, until a point when the instability is revealed and the market
collapses by the positive feedbacks creating the selling rush.
This scenario applies essentially to all market bubbles ending in crashes, in-
cluding old ones such as the many bubbles and bursts in the USA during the
19th century, the bubble in the USA in the 1920s ending in the Oct. 1929 crash
(the US market was considered to be at that time an interesting “emerging”
market with good investment potentialities for national as well as international
investors). In the positive sentiment accompanying and being fueled by the
developing bubble, explanations, appealing to rational reasoning, are offered
to justify the increasing prices. The most famous one is the concept of a “new
economy,” which are surfaced many times, including during the bubbles in the
1920s, during the 1960s “tronic” boom and during the recent bubble on the
Internet and information technology ending in the crash of March 2000. See [3]
for a recent survey of the macroeconomic issues that have developed as a re-
sult of the surprising economic performance of the 1990s expansion, including
some sense of what is known and not known about accelerated productivity
growth, the key driver of the new economy.
How can one go beyond this storytelling? A large literature has addressed the
empirical detectability of bubbles (and in particular of “rational expectation
bubbles”) in financial data (see [6,1] for surveys of this literature). Empirical
research has largely concentrated on testing for exponential trends in the time
series of asset prices and foreign exchange rates [13,62]. However, it has been
shown that tests for exponential roots are quite unreliable in the presence
of the more realistic variant of periodically collapsing rational expectation
bubbles [14]. In fact, certain variants of bubble dynamics might look like the
outcome of a stationary process [43]. They would, therefore, fool the testing
strategy recommended by Hamilton and Whiteman [28] of comparing the sta-
tionarity properties of both asset prices and observable fundamentals. In a
nutshell, the problem is that it is hard if not impossible to distinguish an ex-
ponential explosive bubble from an exponentially growing fundamental price.
The following quote from Federal Reserve Chairman A. Greenspan illustrates
a now famous view [25]: “ We, at the Federal Reserve, recognized that, despite
our suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after
the fact, that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence. Moreover, it was far
from obvious that bubbles, even if identified early, could be preempted short
of the Central Bank inducing a substantial contraction in economic activity,
the very outcome we would be seeking to avoid.”
A different line of attack has been suggested, based on an analogy with so-
called critical phenomena in the statistical physics sense of critical phase tran-
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sitions (see [53,32,37,31,52,51] and references therein). Two hallmarks of spec-
ulative bubbles have been documented: (i) super-exponential power law accel-
eration of the price towards a “critical” time tc corresponding to the end of the
speculative bubble and (ii) log-periodic modulations accelerating according to
a geometric series signaling a discrete hierarchy of time scales. Out-of-sample
tests [36] have shown that, over many analyzed world markets in which 49
drawdown outliers were identified, the log-periodic power law (LPPL) precur-
sors are present in 25 cases, qualifying these bubbles as endogenously gener-
ated. Restricting to the world market indices, 31 drawdown outliers have been
identified of which 19 are preceded with clear LPPL precursors. Systematic
non-parametric tests have also confirmed the relevance of LPPL structures for
the detection of crashes or severe changes of regimes [66,55].
All these studies have been focused on financial time series taken one at a time,
to test whether past market anomalies could be associated with incoming mar-
ket instability. But, of course, the world is multi-dimensional and especially
the financial world is multi-variate: interest rates, implied volatility, volumes,
exchange rates, cross-sectional dependencies between equity and commodity
time series should in principle all be integrated in a global analysis of spec-
ulative bubbles. One step in this direction was performed for the analysis
the bearish market trends unraveling since the summer of 2000 [54,67], which
showed that the majority of European and Western stock market indices as
well as other stock indices exhibit practically the same LPPL “anti-bubble”
3 structure as found for the USA S&P500 index.
Here, we present new evidence in favor of the LPPL theory of speculative
bubbles by testing quantitatively one of the predictions of the scenario 1 − 5
presented above, which underlies financial bubbles and crashes. This predic-
tion concerns the role of foreign investors in providing increasing amounts
of funds, therefore driving up the stock market of the target country as the
bubble develops. Many researchers have indeed stressed the impact of foreign
investments in the fueling of bubbles, preparing the stage of financial insta-
bilities and crashes [19]. Albuquerque et al. have analyzed the unparalleled
increase in foreign direct investment to emerging market economies of the last
25 years [2]. Kim and Wei have shown that foreign investors outside Korea
before and during the Korean currency crisis were more likely to engage in
positive feedback trading strategies and were more likely to engage in herd-
ing than the branches/subsidiaries of foreign institutions in Korea or foreign
individuals living in Korea [39]. Foreign investors’ strategies on future and
option contracts have been found to have a destabilizing role [21]. Dahlquist
and Robertsson found a strong link between foreigners’ trading and local mar-
3 An “anti-bubble” is defined as a self-reinforcing generally severely declining price
trajectory with self-similar expanding log-periodic oscillations, which are the sym-
metric to LPPL bubbles under a time reversal.
5
ket returns [8]. They also found that foreigners act like non-informed feedback
traders as they increase their net holding in firms that have recently performed
well. On the other hand, analyzing the effects of the 1987 stock market crash
on the London markets, the bursting of the Japanese stock market and real
estate market bubble in 1989-1990, the short term and long term consequences
of the turbulence in the European exchange rate system in 1992 and 1993, the
short term and long term effects of the Mexican devaluation in 1995 for Mexico
and other emerging stock markets and the developments in South-East Asia
in 1994-1997, Tesar and Werner purport that, while foreign investors at times
set a financial market crisis in motion (especially currency crises), they have
not been the underlying cause of the crises nor have they exacerbated these
crises [56]. Dooley and Walsh survey the large literature on capital flows and
discuss several possible origins of induced destabilization [9].
We propose to add on this literature by analyzing the relationship between
the stock market in the late 1990s and the net foreign capital inflows in the
USA, available from the Federal Reserve’s web site 4 . The source is the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data correspond
to the net flux of US international transactions: investments of foreigners in
the US are counted positive and US investments outside are deducted. The
net flux corresponds to a given quarter and is seasonally adjusted. The time
evolution of the US foreign assets net capital inflow I(t) per quarter since
1975 is shown in Fig. 1. The net inflow increased over the years, accelerating
to very large values before crashing in the first quarter of 2001.
2 Testing for a LPPL signature in the foreign capital inflow
2.1 Log-periodic power law accelerating structure
We follow the methodology explained in our previous papers [52,51,36,66].
Specifically, we use the generalization of the LPPL formula in terms of the
truncated second-order Weierstrass-type function [22]
I(t) = A +Bxm + ℜ
(
2∑
n=1
Cne
iψnx−sn
)
, (1)
where x = tc−t with tc the end of the bubble and ℜ(·) stands for the real part.
The phases ψ1 and ψ2 are determined from the fit to the data. The exponent
sn is defined as sn = m+ inω. Its real part is the exponent m which controls
4 FRED II: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
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the overall power law dependence of the price trajectory. Its imaginary part
ω is the angular log-frequency of the log-periodicity. The component n = 2
allows for the existence of an harmonics.
This second-order Weierstrass-type function (1) proved to outperform our for-
mer specification in terms of a first-order LPPL function for modelling of the
worldwide 2000-2002 anti-bubbles that started in mid-2000 [54,67]. The special
case Cn = C/n
m+0.5 recovers the zero-phase Weierstrass-type function, which
captures well the five successive crashes within the 2000-2002 anti-bubble in
the US S&P 500 index [68] and models well the ongoing UK real estate bubble
[69].
We fit the seasonally adjusted quarterly net capital foreign inflow to the USA
I(t) of foreign assets (transactions over a given quarter) from 1975 to the first
quarter of 2001. We use the algorithm and the fitting procedure described in
[68]. The optimization search was performed for a critical time tc in a wide
range of tlast ± 1000 trading days by replacing tc − t by |tc − t| in fitting [54],
where tlast is the date of the last point used in the fitting analysis.
Figure 2 shows the fit of the net inflow I(t) to Eq. (1). The predicted crit-
ical time is tc = 2001/03/12, which is consistent with the real date of the
inflow crash that occurred in the first quarter of 2001. Four well-developed
log-periodic oscillations can be observed in Fig. 2. We can also identify their
second-order harmonics, which we analyze further below. We have constrained
the formula to have a non-negative exponent m, to ensure that I(t) remains
finite at tc. With this constraint, the fit chooses the lowest m = 0.01 that we
allow. Slightly better but not significantly better fits are obtained by freeing
m, which then adjusts to values around −0.5, while tc is moved to 2002-2003.
A negative exponent would lead to an unrealistic divergence of the flow and
we thus reject this family of solution. This appears to be justified by the also
unrealistic values of tc obtained with negative m values. Such a small value
of the exponent m means that the power law is equivalent to a logarithmic
law ∼ ln(tc − t), as proposed in [58–60]. The other parameters of the fit are
ω = 4.9, A = 7355, B = −6719, C1 = 21.5 and C2 = 16.2. The r.m.s. of
the fit residuals is 22.810. Note that the comparable amplitudes of C1 and C2
imply the existence of a significant second-order harmonic in the log-periodic
structures of the net inflow bubble.
We test for the robustness of this fit by studying the impact of inflation on
the extracted log-periodic structures. We have deflated I(t) for inflation by
the seasonally adjusted US consumer price index (CPI), also available at the
database FRED II. The original monthly CPI were converted to quarterly CPI
by averaging the three monthly CPIs in each relevant quarter. Figure 3 shows
the time evolution of the deflated US foreign assets net capital inflow I(t) from
1975 to the first quarter of 2001 and its fit to the second-order Weierstrass-type
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function (1). Again, four significant log-periodic oscillations are observed in the
figure, as well as their second-harmonic oscillations, which exhibit very similar
characteristics as in Fig. 2. The predicted critical time is tc = 2001/03/14, the
power-law exponent is m = 0.01 constrained by the positivity condition, and
the angular log-frequency is ω = 5.0, which is essentially undistinguishable
from the value obtained without deflating the price. The linear parameters
are A = 3963, B = −3609, C1 = 15.3 and C2 = 12.0. The r.m.s. residual of
the fit is 16.114. We conclude that inflation has a minor impact on the LPPL
structure as both I(t) and the deflated I(t) exhibit the same accelerating
oscillatory pattern, with the key parameters, ω and tc, which are very close.
2.2 Robustness of the critical time tc
The determination of tc is particularly important as it gives the estimated
termination time of the speculative bubble as well as the most probable time
for a crash or a change of regimes. Since the time evolution of a bubble is
contaminated with noise and the sparseness of the data close to the critical
point, it can be expected that the estimated tc may be quite sensitive to the
length and end-point tlast of the time series used for its determination, as well
as to the properties of the noise [50,52,51]. In our previous studies, we often find
that tc increases with tlast, which makes the prediction of tc unreliable. When
the determination of tc is stable, this gives in general a reliable estimation
of the end of the bubble. In the present case, we find a remarkable strong
robustness of the prediction of tc when changing tlast both on the un-deflated
I(t) and the deflated I(t).
The results of the test on un-deflated I(t) are presented in Table 1 with seven
different values of tlast. For tlast varying from 1999/10/01 to 2001/01/01, the
six fits give almost the same solution with practically unchanging values for
the seven parameters: tc, m, ω, A, B, |C1|, and |C2|. The predicted tc is
found consistently in the first quarter of 2001. When data after 1999/07/01
are excluded ( tlast ≤ 1999/07/01), the solution changes suddenly, with a new
family of estimated tc = 1999/04/27 and a much smaller value for the angular
log-frequency ω = 1.8. Such low value of ω can be interpreted as an artificial
log-frequency stemming from the most probable noise decorating a power law
[29].
Table 1 thus shows that one could have predicted precisely the crash date of
the bubble on the net foreign inflow 1.5 year before the crash happened!
Similar results for the deflated I(t) are presented in Table 2 for eight different
values of tlast. For tlast varying from 1999/07/01 to 2001/01/01, the seven
fits give again almost the same solution with very close values of the seven
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Table 1
Testing the robustness of fits with expression (1) of the seasonally adjusted quar-
terly net capital inflow I(t) not deflated for inflation. Notice the robustness of the
prediction of the critical time tc of the crash as well as that of the angular log-
frequency ω quantifying the log-periodicity.
tlast tc m ω A B |C1| |C2| χ
2001/01/01 2001/03/12 0.01 4.9 7355 -6719 21.5 16.2 22.810
2000/10/01 2001/02/14 0.01 4.9 7243 -6616 21.5 16.4 22.824
2000/07/01 2001/02/06 0.01 4.8 7267 -6639 21.9 16.3 22.882
2000/04/01 2001/03/04 0.01 4.9 7304 -6672 22.1 16.5 22.960
2000/01/01 2001/02/05 0.01 4.8 7165 -6545 22.0 16.3 23.056
1999/10/01 2001/01/31 0.01 4.8 7161 -6542 22.0 16.3 23.169
1999/07/01 1999/04/27 0.01 1.8 2541 -2277 40.5 22.4 21.956
parameters. One can observe that the values of tc and ω for the deflated I(t)
in Table 2 are almost the same as for the un-deflated I(t) in Table 1. Notice,
however, the predicted tc using the un-deflated I(t) are closer to the actual
time of the crash (in the foreign capital inflow), compared with those using the
deflated I(t). This suggests that the un-deflated I(t) is a better measure for
the bubble as herding investors are more sensitive to the actual price than their
deflated value. The difference in values of the linear parameters A, B, |C1| and
|C2| in Table 2 and in Table 1 simply reflect an affine transformation between
the two fitted second-order Weierstrass-type functions. For tlast = 1999/04/01
and for smaller values, the solution branches to another family with incorrect
critical times tc. These results show a rather amazing prediction power of (1)
with respect to the determination of the critical time.
Additional tests on the goodness of the fits and on a non-parametric analysis
of the log-periodicity are offered in the Appendix. In particular, we identify
a rather strong periodicity in the residuals with a period of exactly one year.
Since the formula (1) is describing a scale invariance pattern unfolding as a
function of the time tc− t towards a critical time, regular periodicities are just
additional structures, not relevant here. Our non-parametric analysis of the
log-periodicity gives a strong confirmation to our parametric fit (1) and shows
that even higher harmonics of the fundamental angular log-periodic frequency
ω1 ≈ 5 are present in the data. The possible importance of harmonics in order
to qualify log-periodicity is made also more credible by recent analyses of log-
periodicity in hydrodynamic turbulence data [65,70] which have demonstrated
the important role of higher harmonics in the detection of log-periodicity.
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Table 2
Testing the robustness of fits and the prediction of critical time on the seasonally
adjusted quarterly net capital inflow I(t) deflated by seasonally adjusted consumer
price index for inflation.
tlast tc m ω A B |C1| |C2| χ
2001/01/01 2001/03/14 0.01 5.0 3963 -3609 15.3 12.0 16.114
2000/10/01 2001/02/25 0.01 5.0 3924 -3573 15.3 12.0 16.166
2000/07/01 2001/02/14 0.01 4.9 3926 -3576 15.5 11.9 16.231
2000/04/01 2001/03/29 0.01 5.0 3945 -3592 15.6 12.1 16.254
2000/01/01 2001/04/12 0.01 5.1 3976 -3621 15.6 12.2 16.332
1999/10/01 2001/03/25 0.01 5.0 3951 -3598 15.7 12.2 16.412
1999/07/01 2001/06/12 0.01 5.2 3960 -3606 15.1 12.6 16.394
1999/04/01 1997/04/23 0.01 4.1 2101 -1905 15.0 11.2 16.303
2.3 Comparison between the LPPL patterns in the NASDAQ 100 index and
the foreign capital inflow
From the all-time high on the NASDAQ 100 Composite index of 5133 on
March 10, 2000 to the low at 3321 on April 14, 2000, the NASDAQ 100 lost
over 35%. Johansen and Sornette have shown [33] that this crash was preceded
by a speculative bubble passing all LPPL tests, as defined in Refs. [52,51,36].
The analogy with the infamous crash of October 1929 was found to be striking:
the belief in what was coined a “New Economy” both in 1929 and in the late
1990s made share-prices of companies with three digits price-earning ratios
soar.
Table 3 presents a test of the robustness of the fits with the second-order ap-
proximation of the Weierstrass-type function (1) of the NASDAQ 100 index,
obtained by varying the time interval of the analysis. We vary the start time
of the window of analysis, keeping the ending time fixed at the date of March
10, 2000 (the date the all-time high was reached), as in [33]. The fits and pre-
dictions of tc are very robust with respect to tfirst, confirming the conclusions
obtained previously [33].
In view of the joint detection of LPPL patterns in the NASDAQ 100 Composite
index and in the net foreign capital inflow to the USA, it is natural to ask
whether the two are in any way related. If we compare the three key parameters
m,ω and tc, we find respectively: m = 0.01− 0.18, ω = 7.0± 1 and tc = May
2000 for the NASDAQ 100 index and m = 0.01, ω = 5.0 and tc = March 2001
for the foreign capital inflow. A smaller exponent m implies a slower initial
10
Table 3
Tests of the robustness of the LPPL pattern on the bubble that developed on the
NASDAQ 100 Composite index in the late 1990s. Each row corresponds to a different
start time of the window of analysis, keeping the ending time fixed at the date of
March 10, 2000. Each such time series is fitted with the first-order approximation
of the Weierstrass-type function.
tfirst tc m ω φ A B C χ
1997/03/10 2000/05/25 0.18 7.41 0.08 10.50 -0.93 0.02 0.0609
1996/11/29 2000/06/17 0.01 7.89 0.29 48.88 -38.11 -0.06 0.0603
1996/08/22 2000/06/18 0.02 7.85 3.21 34.70 -23.99 0.05 0.0584
1996/05/14 2000/06/15 0.03 7.79 2.82 22.52 -11.96 0.05 0.0585
1996/02/05 2000/06/04 0.08 7.49 3.89 14.39 -4.21 -0.04 0.0574
1995/10/27 2000/05/17 0.15 6.95 3.36 10.99 -1.34 0.02 0.0574
1995/07/19 2000/05/08 0.18 6.68 4.73 10.31 -0.86 -0.02 0.0565
1995/04/10 2000/03/24 0.33 5.55 3.35 8.98 -0.18 -0.01 0.0613
1994/12/30 2000/05/06 1.00 0.11 4.01 9.09 -0.10 -0.10 0.0637
acceleration finishing more abruptly close to tc, hence suggests that the foreign
capital inflow was lagging behind the NASDAQ 100 index with respect to the
unfolding of the speculative bubble. The later date for tc found for the foreign
capital inflow suggests a confirmation of this lag.
In order to attempt to capture further the existence of a possible synchroniza-
tion between the two time series, we compare the pure log-periodic structures
within the two time series. For this, we construct the log-periodic residues
defined by [I(t)−A−B(tc− t)
m]/(tc− t)
m for the two time series, in order to
extract what should be pure log-periodic oscillations (if no other pattern and
noise were present). We then standardized these residues to have unit variance,
which provides us with the standardized residues RNasdaq(t) and RI(t). Fig. 4
shows RNasdaq(t) and RI(t), plotted as a function of their respective ln(tc− t)
(recall that the two time series have different critical times tc). The thick (resp.
thin) line and upper (resp. lower) horizontal scale correspond to the NASDAQ
100 index (resp. foreign capital inflow). We note that the last two log-periodic
oscillations in the two time series before the crash seem to exhibit a synchro-
nization, when taking into account a log-periodic lag. Indeed, the local
peak in early 1999 in the NASDAQ 100 index residue RNasdaq(t) corresponds
approximately to the local peak in the foreign capital inflow residue RI(t) in
early 2000. Similarly, the local peak in early 2000 in the NASDAQ 100 index
residue RNasdaq(t) corresponds to the local peak in the foreign capital inflow
residue RI(t) in mid 2001. Notice the two logarithmic scales in terms of their
respective ln(tc − t) with different critical times tc for each time series. This
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synchronization with a log-periodic lag suggests that the foreign capital in-
flow has been following a LPPL trajectory similar to that of the NASDAQ
100 index, indicating a speculative bubble. However, this signal on the foreign
capital inflow has been lagging in a self-similar way behind the NASDAQ
100 index bubble. The reference to a log-periodic lag stresses that this lag
was not constant in time but has been shrinking as the bubble approached its
termination. The synchronization is however only approximate as the angular
log-frequencies are different, indicating a transient effect present only at the
end of the bubble. The fact that parallel log-periodicities can culminate at
different critical times is made possible by the extended description in terms
of a hierarchy of singularities offered by the quasi-Weierstrass functions [22].
3 “Egg-and-Chicken” source of the NASDAQ 100 bubble and of
the net capital foreign inflow bubble to the USA
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that foreign investors
have been attracted by the capital gains offered by the bubble on the US stock
market. They have followed the bubble rather than having been at its origin.
The synchronization of the log-periodic patterns of the NASDAQ 100 index
and of the foreign capital inflow however indicates that the foreign capital
inflow may have amplified the bubble, in line with the standard scenario 1−5
of a bubble described in the introduction.
We now attempt to elaborate a bigger picture embodying what could be the
major elements linking foreign capital inflows and the stock market bubble.
We also try to understand the positive feedbacks between the two processes
and how they may be linked with other macroeconomic processes.
We start from the premise that the main mechanism behind the development
of speculative bubbles is the strengthening of herding and over-confidence
among investors, providing positive feedback which further enhances the ex-
pectation of future capital gains [19,20,34,51]. In the case of the internet and
information bubble that ended in 2000, the flowchart shown in Fig. 5 summa-
rizes the main processes involved and illustrate the cause and effects of the
foreign capital inflow.
(i) Box 1 in Fig. 5: It is a well-documented fact that the private disposable
income over expenditure has gone from its long-term average surplus of
about 3% GDP per year in the early 1990s to a deficit approaching 6%
GDP in 2000 [23]. By “private”, we refer to the aggregate of households
and corporation.
(ii) By accounting balance, the surplus of private disposable income over ex-
penditure is equal to the government balance (written as deficit) plus the
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current balance of payment (income from exports minus expenditure to pay
for imports): Private surplus = Government deficit + balance of payment.
(iii) Boxes 2 and 3 in Fig. 5: By (ii), the large private deficit has fostered a
growing deficit of the balance of payment and a diminishing deficit of the
Government turning to surplus in 2000. The larger spending of the private
sector has profited to foreign manufacturers who have been increasingly
successful in invading U.S. markets. The strengthening of the US dollar has
also helped foreigners exports to the US. The growing deficit of the balance
of payment has also resulted from the increased outsourcing of intermediate
products.
(iv) Box 4 in Fig. 5: The annual deficit of the balance of payment has been
growing and reached $500 billion (2% GDP). This deficit corresponds me-
chanically to a surplus for foreign exporting nations, which have accumu-
lated trillions of dollars in reserves since the early 1970s. In 2001, the United
States’ net debt to the rest of the world jumped to $2.3 trillion (this amounts
to about 25% of GDP), a level double that recorded in 1999 [57]. Much of
the increase reflects new borrowing undertaken by the country to finance
its mounting current account deficit. A third of the change, however, could
result from a simple accounting effect, the impact of a rising dollar on the
decreasing value of U.S. assets held abroad.
(v) Box 5 in Fig. 5: To avoid pushing up their own currencies in order to keep
their competitive hedge and because of the large interest rates enjoyed until
2000 on US treasury bonds, foreign central banks reinvested a significant
part of their reserve denominated in US$ back in the US, leading to a large
inflow of capital (see Figs.1 and 2). Thus, the spent US$ fueling the deficit
of the balance of payment have been coming back as a boomerang in the
form of investments by foreign countries [10].
(vi) Boxes 6 and 7 in Fig. 5: However, due to the decreasing deficit of the Federal
government, a decreasing quantify of treasury bonds are been issued, letting
the stock and real-estate markets (Fannie Mae, corporate bonds, NASDAQ
100) as the main siphoning tanks of the foreign capital inflows.
(vii) Boxes 1 and 8 in Fig. 5: This inflow of foreign capital together with an
exhuberant herding mood on the part of investors [47] has fueled the bubble
in the later part of the 1990s.
(viii) Boxes 9 and 1 in Fig. 5: As a result of the impressive appreciation of the
stock market, investors and households have felt richer, spending and con-
suming wantonly, further fueling the bubble by the feedback of this spending
on economic activity, leading to a positive feedback amplification. This is
the so-called wealth effect such that an increase in wealth directly causes
households to increase their consumption and decrease their saving (see for
instance [40] and references therein).
This implies that the 1990s expansion was powered in large part by a large
increase in net spending by the private sector, which itself was fueled by the
exhuberance and optimism resulting from the feedback of the growing stock
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market via the wealth effect on spending. This also suggests a mechanism for
the observed synchronization of the foreign capital inflow documented in this
paper and the stock market LPPL pattern. First, the LPPL pattern of the for-
eign capital inflow documented here shows that foreign investors were following
a herding behavior similar to that of national investors. Second, the feedback
loops between market-appreciation / increased-spending / increased-deficit-of-
balance-of-payment / larger-foreign-surplus / increased-foreign-capital-inflows
rationalize our finding in Fig. 4 of a synchronization of the LPPL pattern taken
as the qualifying signature of a speculative herding bubble.
Another interesting question is the following (we are indebted to J. Spanos
for these remarks): why did it take so long (well into 2001) for the foreign
capital to stop flowing into the US, while the US markets have crashed almost
a year earlier? It seems that foreigners did not acknowledge the coming bear
market in stocks until it was well under way. This implies that the foreigners
did not cause the crash of the stock market. Their actions simply confirmed
it after the fact, with a considerable lag. This confirmation came well before
the 2001 attacks on the world trade center on 911. This is a strong evidence
in proving that the attacks had nothing to do with the bear market which was
already on its way and confirmed by foreign inflows. We also note that both
the NASDAQ crash time and the foreign inflows crash time could have been
forecasted as early as 1999.
4 Implications for the following years
Let us examine the implications of our findings and reasoning for the next
years.
Two main variables have changed since 2000, when compared with the situa-
tion in the late 1990s described in the previous section 3.
First, the stock markets have declined substantially since their all-time highs
in the first quarter of 2000. The NASDAQ 100 has lost close to 75% of its
value at its dip in October 2002, and remains at a loss of close to 70% at the
time of writing. The S&P500 has lost about 47% at its dip in October 2002
and remains negative by about 35%. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost
about 38% at its minimum in October 2002 and remains off by about 23%.
The wealth effect has thus vanished.
Second, the Federal budget surplus of the last years of the 1990s has trans-
formed again into a growing deficit. The private sector spending fury has
abated but the private disposable income over expenditure remains in deficit
and several percent of GDP below its long term average [24]. A radical change
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of attitude to budget deficits has also occurred, which suddenly became re-
spectable as a way to fight fears of recession [38]. In addition, after 911, private
spending of households were encouraged at the highest level of the executive
hierarchy as being patriotic.
Our own analysis for the period from 2000 to 2002 strongly suggest that the
US stock markets has declined as a consequence of another herding process
characteristic of bearish “anti-bubbles” [54,67,68].
The overheating of the speculative bubble led to a crash on the NASDAQ 100
in March-April 2000. As a consequence of vanishing of the wealth effect and
of the self-reinforcing negative sentiments, the stock markets have gone down.
As a result of the increasing Federal budget deficit, foreign capital have flowed
again to buy the debts issued by the treasury, disrupting a part of the flow
that was previously directed to the stock markets. As Fig. 1 and our analysis
show, the crash on the foreign capital inflow coincide with the transition from
surplus to deficit in the Federal budget.
There are several drastically different scenarios, proposed by various analysts
and commentators, for the future evolution of the stock market and of the
economy. Standard measures of valuations suggest that the market has not
yet bottomed as it still appears significantly over-valued; currently, the price-
to-earnings ratio is over 34, the dividend yield is 1.74%, and the price-to-book
value is over three times. Compare this to the bottom in 1982, for which the
price-to-earnings ratio of the S&P 500 was 7, the dividend yield was 6.3%,
and the index was selling at book value.
However, there are strong forces willing to push up the confidence of investors,
to foster the economy and by the same token the stock market, since the later
is a confidence/sentiment thermometer. A first force is the increase in money
supply. Since early 2001, the money supply M1, which is basically cash and
checking accounts, has been rising at a 30% annual rate, with a deceleration
in 2002 and then resuming an acceleration in the first part of 2003, as seen
in Fig. 6. The size and growth of money supply is influenced (controlled?)
by the Federal Reserve System through its direct control over the reserves of
member banks, the discount rate and through open market operations. This
increasing money supply, which is supposed to foster economic development,
also finds its way in the stock market, because companies are not spending the
money to boost capacity, as some industries like semiconductors are working
at only 65% capacity utilization, and the overall capacity utilization rates are
around 75% (compared to +90% in the late 1990s). Companies are also using
this cheap money to re-leverage their balance sheets, similar to consumers
switching their credit card debts to different cards with lower rates.
A second force is found in the behavior of foreign capital inflows. With the
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growing availability of treasury debts, the enormous surplus of foreign central
banks have found again a natural depository, which avoids the risk of inflating
their own currency. However, the interests paid have now plummeted from
above 6% to slightly above 1% per year. The bonds are attractive only on
the basis of a speculative capital appreciation, no more by the paid interests.
Therefore, naturally, foreign capital is attracted to the US stock markets. And
here comes into play a confidence and herding game. Notwithstanding the
stock market over-value, foreign capital (as well as national investors) would
like to see the stock market re-appreciate since they have not many other
choices to invest their surplus dollars. There is thus a growing availability of
capital to hold prices from falling, at least for a while.
This may constitute a part of the explanation for the appreciation of the US
stock market since the uncertainties with the war with Iraq in March 2003
fadded out. Will this continue? At this stage, since we view investors confi-
dence and herding as an important and integral part of the self-organization
of stock markets and of the economy, it is interesting to dwell more on quanti-
tative measures of confidence. So-called market sentiment ratings are obtained
through polls where responses are bullish, bearish or neutral on the market,
which are regularly available [30]. During the entire time when the NASDAQ
100 dropped by more than 75% since March 2000, there was not one weekly
reading showing more bears than bulls. It took the greatest terrorist act in
U.S. history to finally register a week during which there were more bears than
bulls, for the first time in 153 weeks. The plurality of bears over bulls was mi-
nuscule considering the magnitude of the events. The 911 catastrophe could
only produce three consecutive weeks where bears outnumbered bulls, after
which the bulls dominated the sentiment readings again. The study reported in
Barron’s study on May 5th, 2003 gave the following categories and responses:
Very Bullish (9%); Bullish (51.1%); Neutral (28.6%); Bearish (10.5%); and
Very Bearish (0.8%). This is not the type of sentiment (60.1% bulls versus
11.3% bears) after three years of a nasty bear market! This overwhelming
reading, already impressive in a bull market, is unheard of for a bear market.
Our reading of this surprising pervasive bullish sentiment is that it confirms
that the private and foreign investors want the market to go up, but that
there is so much uncertainty that “wishing” is different from “acting,” that
is, investing. Investors are waiting for signs of confirmation of their bullish
sentiment to drive the price up. They have already be burned severely by the
crash in 2000 and the two years that followed. In particular, foreign investors
have strong incentive to buy the US stock market as well as corporate bonds
and the debts in US real estate market [69] in order to get a return on their
surplus dollars above the ridiculous discount rate offered on treasury bonds.
But such action would be warranted only if the market risk is not too high,
hence the conflicted observations of a strong bullish sentiment in a depreciating
stock market. The contradictory conclusions on the economic outlook and
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these polls suggest that the natural herding behavior of investors will be even
more predominant in the future and lead to highly volatile and unstable market
behavior in the near future.
As the US stock market and economy were heating up in the late 1990s,
the higher interest rates and stronger dollar were the natural instruments to
attempt to avoid inflation and to try to stabilize growth but also resulted
from the economic and stock market growth [61]. Actually, as we explained
above, both led to the rather perverse effect of fueling further the bubble by
(1) increasing the deficit of the balance of payment through the deterioration
of competitiveness accompanying a strong dollar and (2) by the attractiveness
of investing in the US for foreign capital in part obtained through the surplus
of foreign countries on their balance of payment.
Now, the situation is different. The economy has been flirting with stagnation
and depression several times in the last two years and the stock markets have
been falling down; hence, the massive cuts in interest rates. Since May 2002,
the strong dollar has been steadily losing ground against the major currencies,
with an acceleration of this loss since November 2002, showing a cumulative
loss of about 28%. As a consequence, investments in the US by foreigners is
becoming less attractive due to the increasing exchange risk and the lowest
interest payment.
Weighting these different ingredients, our prefered scenario for the future is
the following.
• The private sector will continue spending more than its long-term average,
as it is psychologically difficult to abandon habit acquired in good times
(the glorious 1990s) and it is in addition almost considered as a patriotic
act.
• The debt of the Federal Government as well as the private, municipal, cor-
porate and local government debts will continue to rise, reinforcing further
the US as the major deficit nation.
• As a consequence, interests will remain low to allow servicing of the payment
of the interests of the debts, both of private sector and the government. This
will continue to have the effect of further fueling the growth of liquidity by
the mechanism of fostering loans refinancing on lower interest rates (mostly
from residential real estate)
This consequence will also continue to be a source of the two first bul-
lets, acting as a positive feedback loop. The central bank of the US is now
compelled to peg short-term interest rates, promise to forewarn the mar-
ketplace of any intention to adjust the peg. and to guarantee continuous
marketplace liquidity. Federal Reserve operations will continue to work by
aggressively manipulating rates, yield spreads (by repurchasing long-term
debts) and, increasingly, market perceptions to ensure these goals. This is
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further reinforced by the perception that the proposed tax cuts and current
low interest rate environment will further increase liquidity and turn the US
economy around which will power the stock market even further ahead.
• The dollar will continue its descent as a mechanism to fight against the
deficit of the current balance by boosting exports (which translate into
cheaper imports for foreigners). A decrease of the dollar also provides a
mechanical device to decrease the absolute value of the debt. This will ac-
centuate the incentive for foreign central banks to sell progressively their
dollars, but they cannot do it too fast to avoid losing the competitiveness
of their currencies. There is thus a subtle balance between the economic
competition giving rise to surplus in dollars, the corresponding importance
of not having a strong currency and the present lack of attractiveness of
the dollar. We thus envision a slow sell out of the US dollar, but only on
a limited scale since the world is overflowed by dollars, which has replaced
gold at the international reserve currency, since the breakdown of Bretton
Woods (about 80% of the world’s free capital is invested in dollars, even
though the US makes up only about 30% of the world’s economy).
• In view of these negative factors, foreign capital will be less attracted to the
stock market.
From the point of view of detecting large scale cooperative behavior, Fig. 7
presents a long term view of the evolution of the US market proxied by the
DJIA and its extrapolation in the past as explained in [35]. The continuous
line shows the fit with our LPPL formula, a second-order Landau expansion
described in [35,51], which is an extension of the formula (1) to describe such
long time intervals. Fig. 8 shows the residual or difference between the realized
DJIA and the fitted formula. The previous value of the residuals and the
characteristic time scales before recovery suggest that one may wait for a year
or two before the stock market recovers its long-term trend. This appears to
be in line with the prediction that the US stock market will bottom during or
at the end of the first semester of 2004, according to our previous analysis of
the LPPL anti-bubble which started in 2000 [54].
The residuals plotted in Figure 8 show that the current bear market has been
almost as severe as all other bear markets since 1950 but far less severe than the
1932 bear market. One scenario is that the market may have in fact bottomed
out in October of 2002. However, if this is a deflationary bear market as the
US was in 1932, then a huge decline is still ahead. The interest rate data so
far point to a “deflationary” environment but this is far from conclusive as
the Federal Reserve is currently waging war with deflation and is prepared to
drive short term rates to zero to avoid this scenario. But doing so, it is fueling
the credit bubble to unprecedented levels, developing another dimension of
instability.
A very interesting additional information is provided by the behavior of the
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main currencies against the US dollar. We have found unmistakable LPPL sig-
natures of a speculative bubble which is presently developing on the EURO.
Specifically, Figure 9 shows the EURO in US$ and a typical accelerating LPPL
bubble pattern, which is suggestive of a speculative herding buying of EURO’s
using US$. Figure 10 shows the EURO in Yen and again a significant accelerat-
ing LPPL pattern. In contrast, the Yen in US$ does not have any acceleration
(nor has the US$ in Yen), even if a marginally significant log-periodicity may
be observed, as shown in Figure 11. These three figures provide a remarkable
message: the depreciation of the US$ is not just the undirected flight-for-
safety of a herd fleeing from a looming catastrophe; it seems to be associated
with a speculative bubble directed to what is felt (at least on the short- and
medium-term) to be the new haven currency, the EURO.
5 Conclusion
Our main conclusions are the following.
(1) The “sacrifice” of the US$ and the stock market is the cost for a lower
sustainable debt burden on the global US debt structure and for allowing
the slow rebuilding of an internationally competitive economy. This is
reinforced by the evidence for a speculative bubble developing on the
EURO. We thus envision a continuation of the depreciation of the US$
that may reach unprecedented low levels.
(2) On the medium term, the stock market is not going to recover a strong
bullish trend as the growing Federal deficit is consuming a large part
of the foreign surplus dollars and the stock market is remaining a very
risky and unattractive investment. In addition, the huge credit bubble,
that the US has developed in the last decade and is increasingly fueled in
the hope “to avoid deflation,” may be expected to burst and have severe
consequences for the recovery of the economy.
(3) On the short term, the stock market may hold for a while as one of the
main sink of a strong surge of liquidity and of the credit bubble, justified
in the mind of investors by their sentiment and hopes.
The US has been growing as the major deficit nation in the world, attracting
huge amounts of foreign capital. In parallel, it is also growing steadily by im-
migration, powered by a variety of factors. Studying the relationship between
immigration and capital flows, Groznik has shown that, surprisingly, labor not
only moves in the same direction as capital, but it also leads capital [27]. This
finding is also found for various countries, periods and migration flow specifi-
cations. Thus, an important predictive variable for international capital flows
is immigration flows. One strength of the USA has been its ability to attract
people and capital. To what degree this inflow will continue to justify its un-
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sustainable deficits (at all levels) is linked with its potential for development
of new riches and remain to be seen.
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6 Appendix: goodness of fit and non-parametric analysis of log-
periodicity
6.1 Testing the goodness of the fits
We present two tests assessing the goodness-of-fit of the seasonally adjusted
quarterly US net capital inflow I(t) of foreign assets with formula (1). They
are based on the analysis of the fit residuals with the autocorrelation method
[17] and the sign test [44]. Based on a rigorous mathematical proof [16], these
two tests are complementary in their detection of possible remaining patterns
in the residuals. The autocorrelation method is often considered to provide an
estimate of the model error. The sign test is based on an intuition that the
changes of sign of the residuals should be random for a good fit.
Assume that {yi : i = 1, · · · , n} are n observations of the true values φi at
n evenly spaced successive times ti and f(t; Θ) is a proposed model with p
parameters Θ. If Θˆ is an estimate of Θ, then the residuals of the fit are
ei = yi − f(ti; Θˆ) . (2)
The one-lag covariance of the residuals is then defined
a =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
ei × ei+1 , (3)
where the mean of ei is zero (this has been verified to be true in our residuals
with extremely good accuracy ∼ 10−11). The unbiased estimate of the variance
of the residuals is computed as
s2 =
1
n− p
n∑
i=1
e2i . (4)
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By assuming that (1) the fit is made using least-squares, (2) the measurement
errors ǫi = yi− φi are centered random variables with the same variance, and
(3) the data are uncorrelated, one can deduce the first order estimates for the
model error σδ or model bias, defined as the standard deviation of φi−f(ti; Θˆ),
and the measurement error σ, defined as the standard deviation of ǫi:
σ2 ≡ Var[yi − φi] ≈ (1−
p
n
)s2 − a ,
σ2δ ≡ Var[φi − f(ti; Θˆ)] ≈
p
n
s2 + (1− p
n
)a .
(5)
For p/n = 0, Eq. (5) recovers the standard zero order estimations. The key
statistics of the sign test is the frequency f of changes of signs of the residuals
e(ti) given by [16]
f ≈
1
2
−
a
πs2
. (6)
The residuals of our fit are shown in Fig. 12. We have p = 5 free parame-
ters since the four linear parameters are slaved [68]. We find a = −86 and
s2 = 546, which gives a one-lag correlation coefficient a/s2 = −0.16. This
yields σ2 = 602, σ2δ = −56. The negative value of σ
2
δ reflects some anti-
persistence in the residuals. The frequency of changes of signs given by (6)
is f = 0.550, which is not too far from the value 0.5 for completely random
residuals. We cannot however negate the existence of a significant residual
structure, whose prominent characteristic is a strong yearly periodicity, as
shown from the spectrum of the residuals presented Fig. 13.
6.2 Generalized q-analysis of the log-periodic structure
We check the the significance level of the extracted log-periodic pattern using
a non-parametric analysis, called the (H, q)-analysis which we have already
explained and used in our previous works [64,66]. It consists in a generaliza-
tion of the q-analysis [11,12]. The (H, q)-derivative is defined by the following
formula
DHq f(x)
△
=
f(x)− f(qx)
(x− qx)H
, (7)
such that DH=1q f(x) recovers the standard q-derivative Dqf(x). For a power
law function f(x) = Bxm, DH=mq [Bx
m] = B(1 − qm)/(1 − q)m is constant.
In a nutshell, the (H, q)-analysis performs a kind of fractal derivative which
is particularly sensitive to the presence of log-periodicity. The index q refers
to the discrete scaling ratio used in the definition of the fractal q-derivative
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and H is an exponent used to rescale the q-derivative. Scanning q and H
provides an important test of the robustness of the log-periodic structure. A
Lomb periodogram analysis [45] of the (H, q)-derivative allows one to detect
the presence of log-periodicity and assess its significance level.
The analysis was performed on a 19 × 19 grid with H ranging from −0.9 to
0.9 evenly and q varying from 0.05 to 0.95 evenly. Each node (i, j) in the
grid corresponds to a pair (H(i), q(j)), which is converted to a single number
through the one-to-one map: (i, j) → 19 × (i − 1) + j. Figure 14 uses this
number as the abscissa to show the corresponding angular log-frequency ω of
the most significant Lomb peak in each Lomb periodogram for each of the
scanned (H, q) pairs of the (H, q)-derivative of the net foreign capital inflow
I(t) into the USA. Each cross corresponds to a pair of (H, q).
The majority of the ω’s cluster around ω1 = 5, which is consistent with the fun-
damental log-frequency extracted from the fit with equation (1). Furthermore,
one can observe clusters of ω’s at integer multiples ω2 = 10 and ω3 = 15 of
this fundamental angular log-frequency. Some higher-order multiples ω5 ≈ 25,
ω7 ≈ 35 and ω10 ≈ 50 (not shown) are also clearly visible. The deviations
from the exact integer multiples are mostly due to small q’s which are most
sensitive to finite-size effects.
The (H, q)-analysis confirms the presence of a very significant log-periodic
structure in the bubble of the US net capital inflow of foreign assets.
References
[1] Adam, M.C. and A. Szafarz (1992) Speculative Bubbles and Financial Markets,
Oxford Economic Papers 44, 626-640.
[2] Albuquerque, R., N. Loayza and L. Serven (2003) World Market Integration
Through the Lens of Foreign Direct Investors, Simon School of Business
Working Paper No. FR 03-02
[3] Baily, M.N. (2001) Macroeconomic Implications of the New Economy, Institute
for International Economics Working Paper No. 01-09,
(http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=300894)
[4] Bauer, R.J. and J.R. Dahlquist (1999) Technical Market Indicators, Analysis
and Performance (J. Wiley, New York).
[5] Black, F. (1986) Noise, Journal of Finance 41, 529-543.
[6] Camerer, C. (1989) Bubbles and Fads in Asset Prices, Journal of Economic
Surveys 3, 3-41.
22
[7] Cootner, P.H., ed. (1967) The random character of stock market prices
(Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press).
[8] Dahlquist, M. and G. Robertsson (2001) Foreigners’ Trading and Price
Effects Across Firms, SIFR Research Report Series 1, Stockholm Institute
for Financial Research.
[9] Dooley, M.P. and C.E. Walsh (1999) Academic Views of Capital Flows: An
Expanding Universe, RBA Annual Conference Volume 1999-06, Reserve Bank
of Australia.
[10] Duncan, R. (2003) The Dollar Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures (John
Wiley & Sons)
[11] Erzan, A. (1997) Finite q-differences and the discrete renormalization group,
Phys. Letts. A 225, 235-238.
[12] Erzan, A. and J.-P. Eckmann (1997) q-analysis of fractal sets, Phys. Rev. Lett.
78, 3245-3248.
[13] Evans, G.W. (1986) A test for speculative bubbles in the Sterling-Dollar
exchange rate: 1981-84, American Economic Review 76, 621-636.
[14] Evans, G.W. (1991) Pitfalls in Testing for Explosive Bubbles in Asset Prices,
American Economic Review 81, 922-930.
[15] Fama, E.F. (1991) Efficient capital markets, 2, Journal of Finance 46, 1575-
1617.
[16] Femenias, J.-L. (2003) Goodness of fit: Analysis of residuals, J. Molecular
Spectroscopy 217 (2003) 32-42.
[17] Femenias, J.-L. and G. Cheval, (1992) Analysis of residuals in fitting
spectroscopic data, Canadian J. Phys. 70, 152-163.
[18] Fosback, N.G. (1995) Stock market logic (The Institute for Economic Research,
Inc.).
[19] Galbraith, J.K. (1997) The great crash, 1929 (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co.).
[20] Garber, P.M. (2000) Famous first bubbles: the fundamentals of early manias
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
[21] Ghysels, E. and J. Seon (2000) The Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of
Derivative Securities Trading and Foreign Investors, CIRANOWorking Papers
2000s-11, CIRANO
[22] Gluzman, S. and D. Sornette (2002) Log-periodic route to fractal functions,
Phys. Rev. E 65, 036142.
[23] Godley, W. (1999) Seven unsustainable processes (Medium term prospects and
policies for the United States and the world), Special report of The Jerome
Levy Economics Institute, available at
http://www.levy.org/docs/sreport/sevenproc.html
23
[24] Godley, W. (2003) The US economy; A changing strategic predicament, Levy
Economics Institute, February 15, 2003,
http://www.levy.org/docs/stratan/stratpred.html
[25] Greenspan, A. (2002) Economic volatility, speech at a symposium sponsored
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug.,
30).
[26] Grossman, S.J. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1980) On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, American Economic Review 70, 393-408.
[27] Groznik, P. (2003) Immigration and finance,
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=384143
[28] Hamilton, J. and C. Whiteman (1985) The Observable Implications of Self-
Fulfilling Speculative Price Bubbles, Journal of Monetary Economics 16, 353-
373.
[29] Huang, Y., A. Johansen, M. W. Lee, H. Saleur and D. Sornette (2000)
Artifactual Log-Periodicity in Finite-Size Data: Relevance for Earthquake
Aftershocks, J. Geophys. Res. (Solid Earth) 105, 25451-25471.
[30] Investors Intelligence (30 Church St., PO Box 2046, New Rochelle, NY 10801)
[31] Johansen, A., O. Ledoit and D. Sornette (2000) Crashes as critical points,
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 3 (2), 219-255.
[32] Johansen, A. and D. Sornette (1999) Critical Crashes, Risk, 12 (1), 1-94.
[33] Johansen, A. and D. Sornette (2000) The Nasdaq crash of April 2000: Yet
another example of log-periodicity in a speculative bubble ending in a crash,
European Physical Journal B 17, 319-328.
[34] Johansen, A. and D. Sornette (2001) Bubbles and anti-bubbles in Latin-
American, Asian and Western stock markets: An empirical study, International
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 4, 853-920.
[35] Johansen, A. and D. Sornette (2001) Finite-time singularity in the dynamics
of the world population and economic indices, Physica A 294, 465-502.
[36] Johansen, A. and D. Sornette (2003) Endogenous
versus Exogenous Crashes in Financial Markets, submitted to Quantitative
Finance (http://arXiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0210509)
[37] Johansen, A., D. Sornette and O. Ledoit (1999) Predicting Financial Crashes
using discrete scale invariance, Journal of Risk 1 (4), 5-32.
[38] Kilian, L. and S. Manganelli (2003) The Central Bank as a Risk Manager:
Quantifying and Forecasting Inflation Risks, ECB Working Paper No. 226,
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=411589
[39] Kim, W. and S,.-J. Wei (2001) Foreign Portfolio Investors Before and During
a Crisis, Journal of International Economics 56, 77-96.
24
[40] Maki, D.M. and M.G. Palumbo (2001) Disentangling the wealth effect: a cohort
analysis of household saving in the 1990s,
http://www.federalreserve.gov//pubs/feds/2001/200121/200121pap.pdf
[41] Malkiel B.G. (1999) A random walk down Wall Street (WW Norton &
Company: New York).
[42] Markowitz, H. (1959) Portfolio selection: efficient diversification of investment
(New York: Wiley).
[43] Meese, R.A. (1986) Testing for Bubbles in Exchange Rates: A Case of Sparkling
Rates?, Journal of Political Economy 94, 345-373.
[44] Minguzzi, P. (2001) Some practical tools for everyday least squares, J.
Molecular Spectroscopy 209, 169-177.
[45] Press, W.H., S. A. Teulolsky, W. T. Vetterlong and B. P. Flannery (1994)
Numerical Recipies in Fortran, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[46] Shefrin, H. (2000) Beyond greed and fear: understanding behavioral finance
and the psychology of investing (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School
Press).
[47] Shiller, R.J. (2000) Irrational exuberance (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ).
[48] Shleifer, A. (2000) Inefficient markets: an introduction to behavioral finance
(New York: Oxford University Press).
[49] Slanina, F. and Zhang Y.C. (1999) Capital flow in a two-component dynamical
system, Physica A 272, 257-268.
[50] Sornette, D. (2000) Critical Phenomena in Natural Sciences (Springer,
Heidelberg).
[51] Sornette, D. (2003) Why Stock Markets Crash (Critical Events in Complex
Financial Systems) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).
[52] Sornette, D. and A. Johansen, Significance of log-periodic precursors to
financial crashes, Quantitative Finance 1 (2001) 452-471.
[53] Sornette, D., A. Johansen and J.-P. Bouchaud (1996) Stock market crashes,
Precursors and Replicas, J.Phys.I France 6, 167-175.
[54] Sornette, D. and W.-X. Zhou (2002) The US 2000-2002 Market Descent: How
Much Longer and Deeper? Quantitative Finance 2, 468-481.
[55] Sornette, D. and W.-X. Zhou (2003) Predictability of Large Future Changes
in Complex Systems, submitted to Phys. Rev. Lett., preprint at cond-
mat/0304601.
[56] Tesar, L.L. and I.M. Werner (1997) The Internationalization of Securities
Markets Since the 1987 Crash, Paper presented at the October 1997 conference
25
have been published in volume II of the annual Brookings-Wharton Papers on
Financial Services,
http://wrdsenet.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/wfic/papers/97/b6.html.
[57] Tille, C. (2003) The Impact of Exchange Rate Movements on the U.S. Foreign
Debt, Current Issues in Economics and Finance 9, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/rmaghome/curr iss/ci9-1.html
[58] Vandewalle, N., Boveroux, P., Minguet, A. and Ausloos, M. (1998) The crash
of October 1987 seen as a phase transition: amplitude and universality, Physica
A 255, 201-210.
[59] Vandewalle, N., Ausloos, M., Boveroux, P. and Minguet, A. (1998) How the
financial crash of October 1997 could have been predicted, European Physical
Journal B 4, 139-141.
[60] Vandewalle, N., Ausloos, M., Boveroux, P. and Minguet, A. (1999) Visualizing
the log-periodic pattern before crashes, European Physical Journal B 9, 355-
359.
[61] Vlaard, J.G. (2002) On the Strength of the US Dollar: Can it be Explained
by Output Growth? EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper; De
Nederlandsche Bank Staff Report No. 88,
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=300241
[62] Woo, W.T. (1987) Some evidence of speculative bubbles in the foreign
exchange markets, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 19,499-514.
[63] Zhang, Y.C. (1999) Toward a theory of marginally efficient markets, Physica
A 269, 30-44.
[64] Zhou, W.-X. and D. Sornette (2002) Generalized q-Analysis of Log-Periodicity:
Applications to Critical Ruptures, Phys. Rev. E 66, 046111.
[65] Zhou, W.-X. and D. Sornette (2002) Evidence of Intermittent Cascades from
Discrete Hierarchical Dissipation in Turbulence, Physica D 165, 94-125.
[66] Zhou, W.-X. and D. Sornette (2002) Non-Parametric Analyses of Log-Periodic
Precursors to Financial Crashes, in press in Int. J. Modern Phys. C, preprint
at cond-mat/0205531.
[67] Zhou, W.-X. and D. Sornette (2002) Evidence of a Worldwide Stock Market
Log-Periodic Anti-Bubble Since mid-2000, preprint at cond-mat/0212010.
[68] Zhou, W.-X. and D. Sornette (2003) Renormalization Group Analysis of the
2000-2002 anti-bubble in the US S&P 500 index: Explanation of the hierarchy
of 5 crashes and Prediction, preprint at physics/0301023.
[69] Zhou, W.-X. and D. Sornette (2003) 2000-2003 real estate bubble in the UK
but not in the USA, preprint at physics/0303028.
26
[70] Zhou, W.-X., D. Sornette and V.F. Pisarenko (2003) New Evidence of Discrete
Scale Invariance in the Energy Dissipation of Three-Dimensional Turbulence:
Correlation Approach and Direct Spectral Detection, Int. J. Modern Phys. C
14 (4), 459-470.
27
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Date
N
et
 c
ap
ita
l i
nf
lo
w
Fig. 1. Time evolution of the foreign net capital inflow I(t) to the USA per quarter
since 1975. The unit of I(t) is in billion of US dollars while time t is in calendar
year.
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Fig. 2. Fit of the time evolution of the foreign net capital inflow I(t) in the USA from
1975 till the first quarter of 2001 when it reached its maximum, by a second-order
Weierstrass-type function given by expression (1). The predicted critical time is
tc = 2001/03/12, the power-law exponent ism = 0.01, and the angular log-frequency
is ω = 4.9. The fitted linear parameters are A = 7355, B = −6719, C1 = 21.5 and
C2 = 16.2. The r.m.s. of the residuals of the fit is 22.810.
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Fig. 3. Same as Fig. 2 for the deflated foreign net capital inflow in the USA. The
predicted critical time is tc = 2001/03/14, the power-law exponent is m = 0.01, and
the angular log-frequency is ω = 5.0. The fitted linear parameters are A = 3963,
B = −3609, C1 = 15.3 and C2 = 12.0. The r.m.s. of the residuals of the fit is 16.114.
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Fig. 4. This figure shows the two log-periodic residues RNasdaq(t) and RI(t) defined
as R(t) ≡ [I(t)−A−B(tc − t)
m]/(tc − t)
m for the the NASDAQ 100 index and for
the foreign capital inflow. This construction extracts the log-periodic components
of the two time series, while getting rid of their constant level, of their trend and
power law acceleration. These two log-periodic residues are plotted as a function of
their respective ln(tc− t) (recall that the two time series have different critical times
tc). The thick (resp. thin) line and upper (resp. lower) horizontal scale correspond
to the NASDAQ 100 index (resp. foreign capital inflow).
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Fig. 5. Flowchart of the feedback loops between market-appreciation / in-
creased-spending / increased-deficit-of-balance-of-payment / larger-foreign-surplus
/ increased-foreign-capital-inflows, which are proposed to explain the speculative
bubble in the US stock markets and to rationalize the synchronization of the LPPL
patterns shown in Fig. 4. According to this scenario, the 1990s expansion in the
US was powered in large part by a large increase in net spending by the private
sector, which itself was fueled by the exhuberance and optimism resulting from the
feedback of the growing stock market via the wealth effect on spending.
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Fig. 6. Growth of the money supply M1, which is basically cash and checking ac-
counts. The outlying peak is the response to the 911 attack.
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Fig. 7. Long term view of the evolution of the US market proxied by the DJIA and
its extrapolation in the past as explained in [35]. The continuous line shows the fit
with our LPPL formula extended to describe such long time intervals. See [35] and
Chapter 10 of [51] for details.
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Fig. 8. Residual or difference between the realized DJIA and the fitted formula
shown in Fig. 7. The previous behaviors of the residuals and the characteristic time
scales before recovery suggest that one may wait for a year or two before the stock
market recovers its long-term trend.
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Fig. 9. Time evolution of the EURO in US$ (thin fluctuated line) and its LPPL fit
(thick smooth line). The fitted critical time is tc = 2003/10/30 with a power-law ex-
ponent m = 0.13 and angular log-frequency ω = 12.0. The r.m.s. of the fit residuals
is χ = 0.0125. The log-periodicity is highly significant with almost four oscillations.
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Fig. 10. Time evolution of the EURO in Japanese Yen (thin fluctuated line) and
its LPPL fit (thick smooth line). The fitted critical time is tc = 2003/09/04 with a
power-law exponent m = 0.09 and angular log-frequency ω = 7.3. The r.m.s. of the
fit residuals is χ = 1.635.
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Fig. 11. Time evolution of the Yen in US$ (thin fluctuated line). The thick line is its
fit with the LPPL formula (1) with n = 1 (a similar result is obtained with n = 2).
The parameters of the fit are tc = 2003/10/30, m = 1.74 and angular log-frequency
ω = 11.8. The r.m.s. of the fit residuals is χ = 9.78 × 10−5. The value larger than
1 of the exponent m implies the absence of any acceleration of the appreciation of
the Yen in US$.
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Fig. 12. Time evolution of the residuals e(t) of the fit shown in Fig. 2. The one-lag
correlation coefficient is −0.16 showing anti-persistence. The frequency of change of
signs of the residuals is f = 0.55.
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Fig. 13. Spectrum of the residuals e(t) shown in Fig. 12. The very significant peak
corresponds to a periodicity of one year.
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Fig. 14. Angular log-frequency ω of the most significant Lomb peak in each lomb
periodogram in the (H, q)-analysis of I(t). The analysis was performed on a 19×19
grid with H ranging from -0.9 to 0.9 evenly and q varying from 0.05 to 0.95 evenly.
Each node (i, j) in the grid corresponds to a pair (H(i), q(j)), which is converted to
a number in this plot through a one-to-one map: (i, j)→ 19× (i−1)+ j. Each cross
corresponds to a pair of (H, q). Note that W (H(7), q(19)) = 50.4 is not plotted in
the figure for the sake of better presentation.
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